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THE EVER-CHANGING BALANCE OF POWER IN
INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION: DO AFFECTED
STATES HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY AFTER ARKANSAS
V. OKLAHOMA? *
Throughout our nation's history, states have struggled over the issue of
interstate pollution. States have fought over whether one state may pollute
in a manner that causes damage to another state.' Entry of the federal
government into the pollution arena further complicated the question of
who has the power to make such pollution decisions-the polluting state,
the affected state, or the federal government. 2 Nowhere is this tangle of
competing interests and powers more apparent than in the area of interstate
water pollution.3
Traditionally, a state had the authority to determine whether to allow
or disallow pollution within its boundaries. 4 However, water is transient,
and often the pollution of one state affects the waters of a neighboring

* The author wishes to thank Louise Halper and Moira Roberts for their assistance in
the development of this Note.
1. See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 366 (1923) (involving claim by North
Dakota that Minnesota's continued use of drainage ditches caused overflows that resulted in
subsequent damage to North Dakota and its citizens); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296,
298 (1921) (involving action by New York to enjoin New Jersey from discharging sewage into
New York Harbor because such discharge resulted in danger to health of New York citizens);
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907) (involving action by Georgia to
enjoin Tennessee Copper Company from discharging noxious gas from their works in Tennessee
into Georgian territory); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 497 (1906) (involving action by
Missouri to enjoin Illinois from discharging sewage through an artificial channel connecting
Lake Michigan with the Desplaines River, claiming that such discharge heavily polluted
Mississippi River in Missouri).
2. See LAunA M. LAKE, ENVIRO ENTAL REGULATION: Tim POLrTCAL EFFE s OF
IMPLEMENTATION 7-22 (1982) (discussing struggle for power in environmental regulation between
state and federal government).
3. See SusAN J. BucK, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION AND LAW 1113 (1991) (discussing importance of federalism in environmental law).
Buck states that federalism is important in environmental law because federal agencies
rely upon state enforcement of environmental regulations and because many environmental
problems cross political boundaries. Id. at 11. She also notes that federalism affects environmental law because it provides multiple points of access to various interest groups and lobbyists
who influence legislative bodies. Id. at 12. See generally Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977) (critiquing federal structure in environmental regulation, and arguing that federal government's dependence on state and local governments has
compromised environmental policy).
4. Cf. Stewart, supra note 3, at 1220-21 (discussing state's self-determination in area
of environmental regulation). The Clean Water Act (CWA) does leave states autonomy to
adopt more stringent water quality standards than the national minimum standard. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1370 (1988).
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state. 5 This transience limits the- autonomy of the downstream state by
eliminating its ability to choose whether waste shall pollute its water. 6 The
upstream state receives all the economic benefits of the polluting industry,
the downstream state receives the pollution, and the result is interstate
7
conflict.
For the first seventy years of this century, federal courts resolved
interstate pollution conflicts under the federal common law of nuisance,'
which generally allowed the courts to balance competing interests and
fashion a fair and equitable solution to the interstate conflict.9 In the 1970s

5. See Maria V. Maurrasse, Comment, Oklahoma v. EPA: Does the Clean Water Act
Provide an Effective Remedy to Downstream States or Is There Still Room Left for Federal
Common Law?, 45 U. MiAn L. REv. 1137, 1138 (1991) (discussing transient nature of water
and how pollutants from upstream move downstream).
6. See Steven J. Bushong, Case Note, Upstream Pollution and Downstream Problems:
Oklahoma v. E.P.A. Makes a Splash in Interstate Water Pollution Disputes, 63 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 233, 235 (1992) (arguing that upstream state's choice to pollute effectively deprives
downstream state of its choice not to pollute).
7. See Maurrasse, supra note 5, at 1139 (discussing benefits and burdens that result
from interstate pollution).
8. See Michael Collins, The Dilemma of the Downstream State: The Untimely Demise
of Federal Common Law Nuisance, 11 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. RE. 297, 311-25 (1984)
(summarizing history of federal common-law nuisance); Calvin R. Dexter & Teresa J. Schwarzenbart, Note, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise of the Federal Common Law of
Water Pollution, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 627, 630-36 (same); Steven Gaynor, Comment, The
Dilemma of the Downstream Plaintiff in an Interstate Water Pollution Case, 37 BuFF. L.
Rav. 257, 275-77 (1988-1989) (same); R. Stacy Lane, Note, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
Clearing the Muddied Preemption Waters of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 17
CAP. U. L. REv. 501, 502-07 (1989) (same); Maurrasse, supra note 5' at 1142-45 (same).
Federal common-law nuisance in the interstate pollution context originated in Missouri v.
Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), in which the Supreme Court held that thIe federal courts had
power to hear interstate pollution disputes, but that Missouri was not entitled to relief because
it had failed to prove damages. Id. at 518, 526. In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230 (1907), the Court held that a state has #a quasi-sovereign right to preserve the
environment within its boundaries. Id. at 237. However, it was not until 1972 that the Court
explicitly stated that federal common-law nuisance existed in the realm of interstate water
pollution disputes. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 105 (1972). The
Court held that federal common law was a proper remedy for states that suffer degradation
of environmental resources by outside sources. Id. at 107.
9. See Dexter & Schwarzenbart, supra note 8, at 631-32, 635-36 (discussing concerns of
Supreme Court in interstate nuisance law). The Court in its early decisions expressed three
concerns: (1) preserving the balance of power between the Supreme Court and state government;
(2) providing a peaceful forum for resolution of interstate pollution disputes; and (3) providing
a state with the means to preserve its environment. See Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 23738 (expressing Court's concern that it provide state with means to preserve state's environment);
Missouri, 200 U.S. at 520-21 (expressing Court's concern that it preserve balance of power
between Court and state government and that Court provide peaceful forum for resolution of
interstate pollution disputes). The Court found that the provision of equitable remedies through
federal common-law nuisance claims properly balanced these interests and concerns. See
Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237-38 (holding that equity remedy was proper for deciding
interstate pollution disputes); Missouri, 200 U.S. at 520-21 (same). The Court reaffirmed these
concerns in Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 104-05, and held that federal common-law nuisance

19931

INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION

1343

the balance of power between the states changed dramatically with the
introduction of a new federal entity as a major player-the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). The federal government imposed broad-scale
environmental regulation of water pollution with the enactment of the Clean
Water Act (CWA) in 1972 and subsequent EPA enforcement.' 0 Following
this federal incursion into traditional state authority, the United States
Supreme Court in two separate decisions declared that the CWA preempted
the common-law remedies upon which the downstream states had relied for
relief." The result was a severe and sudden shift in the balance of power:
the federal EPA and the source state became the dominant powers in
interstate water pollution conflicts, leaving the affected state with the limited
protection of CWA remedies.
Recently, the Supreme Court altered this balance in Arkansas v. Oklahoma,'2 to the apparent detriment of affected states. In Arkansas the Court
granted the EPA power to interpret a state's water quality standards even
though such interpretation is inconsistent with the state's own determination.'3 The result is that the affected state has little, if anything, to say in
the interstate water pollution conflict.' 4 This Note examines the relationship
between the EPA and the states-downstream and upstream-following
Arkansas v. Oklahoma. First, it examines the history of the interstate water
pollution conflict and the balance of power between the EPA and the states
from enactment of the CWA to the Arkansas opinion. Second, it examines
the conflict arising in the Arkansas case and the Supreme Court's resolution
of that conflict. Third, it examines the balance of power following the
Arkansas decision, which apparently leaves the affected state without power
to protect its waters from other states' pollution. Finally, this Note suggests
that the affected state is not so powerless as first appears, and suggests
how the affected state can protect its own water quality standards against
the encroachment of other states and the EPA.

I.

THE CLEAN WATER ACT

Traditionally, states regulated intrastate water pollution. In 1972 Congress enacted the CWA-a comprehensive national water pollution preven-

would provide an equitable remedy to these disputes. Id. at 106-07. Thus, the Court found
the equitable remedy of federal common-law nuisance to balance the competing interests and
concerns of interstate pollution.
10. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1988).
11. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) (holding CWA

preempted affected state's common law); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451
U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (holding Clean Water Act preempted federal common-law nuisance).
12. 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992).
13. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1059 (1992) (holding that EPA
interpretation was reasonable even though inconsistent with Oklahoma's interpretation).
14. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text (discussing affected state's power
following Arkansas).

15. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under
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tion scheme 6-in order to provide for a national pollution control effort.' 7
The CWA shifted some traditional state power to the EPA, striking a

balance between a state's authority to regulate its own water pollution and
the federal government's interest in preventing water pollution nationally.

The enforcement mechanism of the CWA is the National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).' s The NPDES program requires
issuance of a permit before a discharger may empty waste directly into the
nation's waterways. 9 Under the CWA, either the EPA or a state with an
EPA-approved program may administer the NPDES program. 2 A state may
obtain EPA approval when its program meets the minimum standards of
federal law and implementing regulations. 21 However, the EPA oversees all
state-approved programs.Y Therefore, the NPDES program allows states to

the Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1167, 1176-86 (1983) (discussing increasing intervention
of federal government in area of traditional state authority).
16. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1988).
17. See Maurrasse, supra note 5, at 1146 (discussing congressional reasons for federal
intervention in environmental regulation). Congress entered the area of water pollution control
in 1948 with the enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948. Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)). The 1948 Act provided that the federal government fund state
efforts at pollution control and offer states technical advice. See Gaba, supra note 15, at 1177
(discussing Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948). Pollution control efforts remained
within the authority of the states. Id. The 1948 Act provided no provision for federal review
and limited opportunity for federal enforcement. Id. In 1965 Congress adopted the Water
Quality Act of 1965. Pub. L. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903. The 1965 Act differed from the 1948 Act
by authorizing federal enforcement of water quality standard violations. See Gaba, supra note
15, at 1178 (discussing differences between Water Quality Act of 1965 and Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1948). In addition the 1965 Act required that siates adopt water
quality standards subject to the review and approval of the federal government. Id. Although
an improvement over the 1948 Act, the 1965 Act was largely ineffective because federal
enforcement was limited. Id. at 1179 (discussing ineffectiveness of 1965 Act in controlling
pollution). Because of the inability of the prior acts to effectively control water pollution,
Congress adopted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. See id. at
1180 (discussing reasons for amendment).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988). See generally Kristy A. Niehaus Bulleit & Diane U.
Montgomery, Clean Water Act Permitting: The NPDES Program at Twenty, in THE ENvIRONmENTAL LAW MANtu'AL 161 (Theodore L. Garrett ed., 1992) (detailing requirements of
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program); Claudia Copeland,
Comprehensive Clean Air and Clean Water Permits: Is the Glass Still Just Half Full?, 21
Eicvm. L. 2135 (1991) (detailing requirements of NPDES program and comparing requirements
to permitting requirements under Clean Air Act (CAA).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 1342(b). The CWA requires that the state's governor submit to the federal
administrator a description of its proposed program to gain approval. Id. The program must
ensure compliance with the state's water quality standards and effluent limitations. Id. §
1342(b)(1). In addition, the plan must provide for notice and an opportunity for comment if
the issued permit will affect another state. Id. § 1342(b)(3), (5).
22. Id. § 1342. The CWA requires that state-approved programs "shall at all times"
comply with the federal requirements. Id. § 1342(c)(2). Thus, by implication, the EPA must
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continue to regulate water pollution, but balances state authority against
EPA authority to review state determinations.23
The CWA development of national water quality standards also strikes
a balance between state and federal power. The CWA requires each state
to comply with a federal minimum water quality standard?2 To comply,
each state must promulgate a standard and obtain EPA approval.2 Once
the state satisfies the federal minimum requirements, it is free to adopt
more stringent standards. 26 Thus, the state has some freedom to regulate

its own water quality.
In addition to meeting minimum federal water quality standards, states
must comply with federal limits on the amount of pollutants discharged

into waterways. 27 The EPA promulgates discharge limitations that the states
must incorporate into state permits. 28 As with the water quality standards,
states have the authority
to impose more stringent discharge limitations than
29
those of the EPA.
The balancing of various state and federal interests becomes more
complex when an interstate waterway is involved. Congress specifically
addressed the interstate conflict in the CWA.3 0 The statute provides that if
a discharge permit affects a state other than the source state, the source

state must notify the affected state and allow it opportunity for comment."
The source state is free to reject or to accept the written recommendations
of the affected state provided that it justifies its action to the EPA. 32

Regardless of the effect on, and objections of, other states, the source state
may issue a pollution permit if the permit complies with the source state's
own standards. 33 The downstream state's only recourse is to seek EPA
review.

ensure that state programs comply. For a more thorough discussion of EPA oversight, see
Colburn T. Cherney & Karen M. Wardzinski, State and FederalRoles under the Clean Water
Act, in THE ENVIRONMNTAL LAW MANuAL 233, 235-40 (Theodore L. Garrett ed., 1992)
(discussing federal oversight of state programs and how such oversight is important for effective
administration of NPDES program).
23. See generally Cherney & Wardzinski, supra note 22, at 33-34 (examining roles of
state and federal government under NPDES program). Cherney and Wardzinski observe that
the federal government has complete authority for requiring the minimum pollution protection.
Id.at 233-34. However, they also note that states have considerable autonomy to issue more
stringent standards than the federal requirements. Id. The authors argue that such flexibility
and balance in the NPDES program promotes effective management of pollution control. Id.
at 234.
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(1) (1988).
25. Id.§ 1342(a)(3).
26. Id.§ 1370.
27. Id.§ 1311.
28. Id.§ 1314(b).
29. Id.§ 1370.
30. Id.§ 1342(b).
31. Id.§ 1342(b)(5).
32. Id.
33. Id.§1342(b).
34. Id.§ 1342(d)(2). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may object to a
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Inevitably, interstate conflicts over discharge permits reached the Supreme Court. The first conflict to reach the Supreme Court was in City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee I1),15 in which Illinois sued the city of
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, claiming that Milwaukee's discharges into Lake
Michigan constituted a nuisance. 36 The Supreme Court ruled that the CWA's
comprehensive regulatory scheme preempted Illinois's claim.

7

The Court

reasoned that, under the CWA, only Congress and the EPA had the
authority to require standards. 3 Because the federal common law imposed

stricter standards than those required under the CWA, the CWA preempted
the claim. 39 The Court further found that the CWA provided an affected

state with a forum to protect its interests-the EPA40-and
therefore, the
4
affected state had an opportunity to seek redress .

In Milwaukee 11 the Court did not address whether the CWA preempts
a state common-law claim brought by an individual citizen. 42 Six years later,

permit if the EPA determines that the issuance was outside the guidelines and requirements
of § 1342. Id.
35. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). This case was the second meeting between Illinois and Milwaukee
in the Supreme Court. In 1972, five months before Congress enacted the CWA, Illinois filed
a motion for leave to file a complaint against four cities and two local sewerage commissions
in Wisconsin for allegedly polluting Lake Michigan. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee
I), 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). The Supreme Court declared that states may seek a remedy under
federal common-law nuisance if an out-of-state source's discharge violates the downstream
state's water quality. Id. at 107. However, the Court did not grant the motion, but rather
remitted the case on other grounds. Id. at 108.
36. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 309-10 (1981). Illinois
claimed that the Milwaukee sewage discharges contained pathogens, disease-causing viruses
and bacteria that constituted a threat to the health of Illinois citizens. Id at 309. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered judgment in favor of Illinois
and ordered Milwaukee to eliminate all overflows and to achieve specified effluent limitations
on treated sewage. Id. at 311. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
CWA did not preempt federal common-law nuisance but stated that a court should use the
CWA as guidance. Id. at 312. The circuit court reversed the district court's effluent limitation
requirements because such requirements were more stringent than the CWA. Id. However, the
court of appeals upheld the district court's order to eliminate all overflows. Id.
37. Id. at 317. See generally Collins, supra note 8 (critiquing Supreme Court's holding
in Milwaukee II, and arguing that Court wrongly conceptualized congressional intent and
therefore wrongly determined that federal common law and CWA are irreconcilable).
38. Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. at 320. The Court noted that Congress and its administrative
agency had thoroughly addressed the problem of effluent limitations; therefore, a federal court
lacks the authority to impose more stringent limitations than those imposed by the statute and
regulations. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 325-26. The Court examined in depth the forum provided by the CWA. Id.
at 326. The Court noted that the CWA provides that each affected state must receive notification
of the permit application, an opportunity to participate in a public hearing, and an opportunity
to submit written recommendations concerning the permit applicant. Id. In addition, the EPA
may veto any permit which may affect waters of another state. Id.
41. Id. The Court noted that Illinois failed to avail itself of the opportunities for redress
provided by the CWA. Id.
42. See Bushong, supra note 6, at 242 (discussing failure of Supreme Court to address
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the Court addressed this issue in InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette.4 3 In
Ouellette a group of Vermont property owners sued a New York paper mill
under Vermont nuisance law. 44 The Supreme Court held that the CWA
preempts the common law of an affected state to the extent that such law
imposes liability on a source in another state.4 5 The Court reasoned that
the comprehensive scheme of the CWA demonstrated congressional intent
to preempt state law suits," except for those suits specifically preserved in
the statute. 47 The Court then examined the CWA's carefully constructed
balance between the source state, the affected state, and the EPA. 4 The
Court concluded that imposing the affected state's common law on the
source would upset the CWA balance 49 and would put the affected state in
a stronger position than Congress intended. s0
The Ouellette Court reasoned, however, that although the CWA preempted
claims based on the laws of the affected state, the CWA did not preempt
claims based on the laws of the source state."1 The Court noted that the

whether state common-law claims applied to interstate pollution following Milwaukee II);
Dexter & Schwarzenbart, supra note 8, at 662-88 (analyzing possible effects of Milwaukee II
on state nuisance law); see also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee III), 731 F.2d 403,
410-11 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that CWA preempted state's common-law claim in state where
injury occurred), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985).
43. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
44. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 484 (1987). In Ouellette a group
of Vermont property owners brought suit in Vermont against the International Paper Company,
a paper mill operating in New York. Id. at 484. The plaintiffs claimed that the mill's discharge
violated Vermont common-law nuisance. Id. The United States District Court for the District
of Vermont held that the savings clause of the CWA permitted a common-law nuisance claim
under the law of the state in which the injury occurred. Id. at 486. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed. Id. at 487. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict between the Second Circuit and the Seventh Circuit. Id.; see Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d
at 414 (holding that CWA preempts state common law of state in which injury occurred).
45. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494. See generally Lane, supra note 8 (arguing that Ouellette
was correct because it clarified roles of each state in interstate water pollution conflicts and
provided recourse to injured individuals); Maurrasse, supra note 5 (arguing that Ouellette was
incorrect because Court was unable to provide convincing basis for preferring upstream state
interests over those of downstream state and because decision eliminated downstream state's
effective remedy).
46. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 492.
47. Id. The Court examined the savings clause of the CWA and concluded that it was
not applicable. Id. at 493. The Court then examined the goals and purposes of the CWA and
concluded that application of an injured state's common law would interfere with these goals
and purposes. Id. at 493-94.
48. Id. at 494-97.
49. Id. at 497.
50. Id. The Court determined that the affected state's nuisance laws would subject the
source to liability in the event that the affected state's standards were more stringent than the
source state. Id. at 495. The Court reasoned that such liability would compel the source to
adopt different control standards even though the source was in compliance with its own
standards. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that such liability indirectly would allow affected
states to regulate the conduct of out-of-state sources. Id.
51. Id. at 497.
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CWA specifically preserved source state remedies5

2

and that suits brought

under the laws of the source state would maintain the intended balance and
not frustrate the goals of Congress."

In calibrating the source state-affected state-EPA balance in Milwaukee
11 and Ouellette, the Supreme Court determined that Congress intended for
the EPA and the source state to dominate affected states in interstate
pollution disputes.5 4 The Court relegated the affected state to a subordinate

position, with only a minor say in the process of issuing pollution permits.

5

Moreover, the affected state has only limited opportunity to seek redress

outside of the permitting process. 6 Following Ouellette, the affected state
may bring suit under the common law of the source state, but in most
instances the discharger will have complied with the standards of the source
state. 57 Therefore, source state common law offers little help to the affected
state. The affected state is therefore left with only the authority to voice

objections, first to the source state, which may disregard the objections,
and then to the EPA, which previously has approved the source state's

standards."
II.

Arkansas v. Oklahoma

Whereas Milwaukee I1 and Ouellette significantly diminished the role
of the affected state, Arkansas v. Oklahoma expanded the role of the

EPA.

9

This expanded role changes the balance of power in instances

52. Id. The Court determined that the Savings Clause of the CWA allows states to
impose higher standards on their own point sources, and that this authority may include the
right to impose higher common-law as well as higher statutory restrictions. Id.
53. Id. at 498. The Court concluded that because the CWA permits source states to
impose higher standards, the application of the source state's law does not disturb the balance
among federal, source state, and affected state interests. Id. at 498-99. In addition the Court
determined that application of source state common law prevents a source from being subject
to an indeterminate number of potential regulations; the source need only look to the permit
regulations and the common law of its location. Id. at 499.
54. See id. at 489-91 (describing CWA structure among parties involved in interstate
pollution dispute). In Ouellette, the Supreme Court articulated its interpretation of the CWA
framework. Id. at 490. The Court determined that the CWA established a "partnership"
between the Federal Government and the source state. Id. However, the role of the affected
state is clearly subordinate. Id. at 491. See generally City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304 (1981) (holding that federal common law was preempted, and thus providing downstream
states with CWA procedure as only means to protect its interests).
55. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987) (declaring that
affected states occupy subordinate position to source states); Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 328
(holding that states cannot enforce more stringent standards on out-of-state sources).
56. See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497-99 (holding that affected state may use source state
common law to seek redress); Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 325-36 (holding that CWA provides
ample opportunity for affected state to seek redress).
57. See Maurrasse, supra note 5, at 1157 (discussing ineffectiveness of common-law
remedy following Ouellette).
58. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (discussing affected state's options for
redress under CWA).
59. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1059-61 (1992) (holding that EPA has
considerable power to interpret CWA and water quality standards).
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involving a downstream state and its own antidegradation standard-a water
quality standard that requires protection and maintenance of high quality
waters.
The Arkansas dispute originated when the city of Fayetteville, Arkansas,
decided to build a new sewage treatment facility that would discharge waste

into a nearby stream. 60 This stream ran into the Illinois River and crossed
the border into Oklahoma about forty miles downstream. 6 Arkansas applied
for and received an EPA discharge permit. 62 Oklahoma challenged the
permit, claiming that the discharge violated Oklahoma antidegradation water
quality standards. 63 An EPA administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that
the discharge would
not violate Oklahoma standards unless it created an
"undue impact,"' 4 and that no undue impact in this case existed. 65 On
administrative appeal, the EPA Chief Judicial Officer (CJO) ruled that the
undue impact standard was too lenient to the source state to be consistent
with the protections of the CWA. 66 The CJO ruled that if the discharge
caused a "detectable violation" in the Oklahoma water quality standards,
then the EPA should deny the permit. 67 On remand the ALJ found no
detectable violation of Oklahoma's water quality standards and affirmed
the issuance of the permit. 6
A. The Tenth Circuit's Decision
The administrative decision of the CJO and ALJ did not satisfy either
Oklahoma or Arkansas. Oklahoma appealed because the EPA granted the
60. Id. at 1051.
61. Id.
62. Id. The permit authorized the plant to discharge up to half of its effluent into the
unnamed stream that eventually flows into the Illinois River. Id. The permit imposed limitations
on quantity, content, and character of the discharge. Id. In addition the permit included a
special condition which provided that the permit would be modified to ensure compliance with
Oklahoma's water quality standards if a study determined that more stringent limitations were
necessary. Id.
63. Id. Oklahoma claimed that its antidegradation policy prohibited any degradation of
outstanding resource waters. Respondent's Brief at 32-33, Arkansas, (No. 90-1262). Oklahoma
determined and advised the EPA that the Illinois River had undergone considerable degradation
and that Fayetteville's own assessment of the impact of its discharge showed that the resulting
changes would be degradation and not consistent with Oklahoma nutrient standards. Id. Thus,
Oklahoma advised the EPA that the discharge would violate its antidegradation standard. Id.
64. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1051 (1992). The Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) determined that the "undue burden" test requires something more than a de minimis
impact on the affected state's water quality. Petitioner's Brief Appendix F at 102a, (No. 901262).
65. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1051. The ALI concluded that the plant's discharge would
be de minimis at most because the changes suggested by the Oklahoma witnesses would be
unmeasurable, and the witnesses failed to consider the assimilative capacity of the river.
Petitioner's Brief Appendix F at 103a. Thus, the ALI held that the plant's discharge would
not constitute an undue burden on the interstate waters. Id.
66. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1052.
67. Id. The detectable violation test requires a showing that the discharge would result
in a verifiable and measurable violation. Petitioner's Brief Appendix G at 117a.
68. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1052.
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permit in spite of its objections. 69 Arkansas appealed because the EPA
70
required compliance with a downstream state's water quality standards.
7
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ' addressed this issue by first
considering whether a pollution source must comply with the water quality
standards of all affected states. 72 The court analyzed the issue in light of
congressional intent, 73 judicial precedent, 74 and the statutory and regulatory
framework of the CWA.7 5 The court concluded that the EPA must deny a
permit when the applicant's discharge would violate the water quality
standards of the downstream state. 76

69. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 597 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 595. For a thorough analysis of Oklahoma v. EPA, see generally Bushong,
supra note 6 (arguing that Tenth Circuit's ruling is correct because it comports with Congressional intent by encouraging reduction of water pollution); Maurrasse, supra note 5, at 115877 (criticizing Tenth Circuit's holding as contradictory to text and legislative history of CWA);
John Treangen, Note, Cleaning up the Clean Water Act: Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency, 36 S.D. L. REv. 739 (1991) (arguing throughout that Tenth Circuit's holding
promotes interests and intent of CWA).
72. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 602-15.
73. See id. at 604-07 (examining whether Congress intended that source states comply
with water quality standards of downstream states). The Court examined the legislative intent
in light of the purpose of the CWA. Id. The court focused on § 1311(b)(l)(C) of the CWA..
Although this implementation section lacks clarity, the court found the fact that the section
does not distinguish between the source and affected state important. Id. at 606. Furthermore,
the court concluded that unless source states comply with .the water quality of affected states,
a disproportionate burden will fall upon those dischargers within the affected state to prevent
violations of water quality standards. Id. Finally, the court concluded that compliance with
an affected state's water quality standards prevents "pollution shopping," consistent with the
goals of Congress. Id.
74. See id. at 607-09 (distinguishing Milwaukee II and Ouellette). The court acknowledged
in its discussion of Ouellette that some language within the opinion prohibits the EPA from
requiring that a source state comply with the law of an affected state. Id. at 608. However,
the court noted that such language was dicta and thus not controlling. Id. Furthermore, the
court noted that Milwaukee 1I and Ouellette turned on state law questions, whereas Oklahoma
turned on the question of how to apply federally approved standards. Id.
75. See id. at 609-15 (examining plain language of CWA). The court found § 1341(a)(1)(2) persuasive. Id. at 609-10. The section states that if an affected state determines that a
discharge will affect the water quality, the affected state shall notify the source state and
request a public hearing. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1988). Furthermore, the statute states that
the source state must condition the permit in a manner which shall ensure compliance with
applicable water quality standards. Id. The court interpreted this provision as enabling the
affected state to ensure that the source will not violate the affected state's water quality
standards. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 610 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom Arkansas
v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992).
The court also examined § 1365(h) of the CWA, which allows a governor to sue the
EPA to enforce an effluent limitation. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1988); Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at
614-15. The court determined that this section provided a remedy for an injurious impact on
that state's water quality because "effluent limitations are not an end in themselves, but simply
a means to an end-the desired water quality." Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 614.
76. See Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 615 (holding that CWA and EPA regulations prohibit
discharge to navigable water unless discharge complies with all applicable water quality
standards).
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The court next considered whether the CWA permitted a new discharge
into a currently degraded waterway. Although the parties did not raise the
issue," the Tenth Circuit raised the issue sua sponte because the court
determined that the issue was of extreme importance. 78 The court first
concluded that Oklahoma's highest antidegradation standard applied because
Oklahoma had designated the Illinois River a scenic river 29 The Tenth
Circuit next concluded that the EPA had misinterpreted and misapplied the
standard, 0 and that the EPA therefore was arbitrary and capricious by
granting the Arkansas permit.8' Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that the
CWA prohibits further discharges into waterways that do not comply with
state water quality standards, 2 and thus, the EPA should have denied the
permit because the Illinois River violated Oklahoma water quality standards.83
The Tenth Circuit altered the federal-state balance by lessening the
power of the EPA and the upstream state and by strengthening the power
of the downstream state. Oklahoma required the source state to comply
with the laws of the downstream state. Furthermore, the decision limited
the EPA's ability to interpret state water quality standards. Oklahoma held
that the CWA mandated a complete ban on discharges into a body of water
not currently in compliance with state water quality standards.85 This ban
eliminated EPA discretion to interpret whether a discharge would affect the
water when the water violated current quality standards.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
Arkansas and the EPA appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.86 The petitioners asked the Court to consider three issues: (1)
77. Id. at 615-16.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 617.
80. Id. at 616. The Tenth Circuit interpreted the Beneficial Use-Antidegradation policy
to prohibit any degradation of the water quality of the scenic rivers. Id. at 618. The court
concluded that the ALJ erred by requiring Oklahoma to prove that the discharge would create
a nuisance rather than placing the burden upon the permit applicant. Id. at 620.
81. Id.
82. Id. The court justified its decision with testimony stating that the Illinois River could
not assimilate any further discharge because of its degraded condition. Id. at 620 n.39. In
addition, the court stated, "once water quality standards in a stream were violated, additional
new discharges might be permitted indefinitely so long as each one would have an unmeasurable
individual impact." Id. at 632.
83. Id. at 629. The Tenth Circuit made three determinations in reaching its decision. Id.
at 621. First, the court concluded that the record showed sufficient evidence to determine that
the Illinois River was degraded and violated Oklahoma's water quality standards. Id. at 625.
Second, the court determined that the evidence showed that Fayetteville's effluent would travel
downstream to the Illinois River. Id. at 627. Finally, the court concluded that ample evidence
showed that the Fayetteville effluent would contribute to the further deterioration of the river.
Id. at 629.
84. Id. at 615.
85. Id. at 615-20.
86. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1052 (1992). The Court cited the importance
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whether the CWA requires the EPA to apply the water quality standards
of a downstream state;8 7 (2) whether the EPA has the authority to mandate
such compliance if the CWA does not require the agency to apply the
downstream state's water quality standards; 88 and (3) whether the CWA
prohibits a further discharge into an already degraded waterway if such
discharge yields effluent that reaches the degraded water.Y9 The Court chose
not to resolve whether the CWA requires the EPA to apply the water
quality standards of a downstream state. 90 The Court concluded that the

EPA decision to regulate compliance was reasonable, and therefore, the
issue of whether the CWA requires a source to comply with downstream
state water quality standards was relatively unimportant.9'
As to whether the EPA has authority to require compliance with
downstream state standards, the Court concluded that the EPA regulations

requiring compliance were reasonable and within EPA statutory authority. 92
The Court reasoned that the CWA gave the Administrator broad discretion

to institute requirements for NPDES permits, 93 and that the regulations fell
within that statutory discretion 94 and were consistent with the general purpose
of the statute. 9 Arkansas argued that the application of Oklahoma standards
was inconsistent with Ouellette.96 Arkansas contended that requiring compliance with an affected state's standards grants the affected state a much
greater role than the "subordinate" role specified in Ouellette.9 7 The Court
rejected Arkansas's argument, reasoning that Ouellette pertained merely to
an affected state's input into the permit process and did not constrain EPA

of the issue and the novelty of the Tenth Circuit's decision as the reason for the grant of
certiorari. Id.
87. Id. at 1056.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.

91. Id. In addition, the arguments of the parties relied extensively on governing provisions
of both federal permits and state permits, and the Court deemed it unwise to analyze these
arguments when the case involved only a federal permit. Id.
92. Id.

93. Id. The Court noted the broad authority that the CWA gave to the EPA. Id. The
statute provides that the EPA shall prescribe conditions to assure compliance with the
requirements of the NPDES program and "such other requirements as he deems appropriate."
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) (1988). In addition the statute gave the EPA broad authority to oversee
state permit programs. Id. § 1342(d)(2).
94. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1056 (1992).
95. Id. The general purpose of the statute is "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988). In addition
one of the CWA's central objectives is the achievement of state water quality standards. Id.
§ 1311(b)(1)(C). The Court concluded that the EPA regulations are a well-tailored means of
achieving the stated goals and objectives. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1056.
96. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1056-57; see International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.
481, 490-91 (1987) (characterizing position of affected state as subordinate to source state
under CWA).
97. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1056-57.
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authority to require a source to comply with an affected state's standards.98
The Court also rejected Arkansas's argument that the EPA requirements
were inconsistent with the legislative history of the CWA and the federalstate scheme that the CWA created. 9 The Court examined the legislative
history and found no congressional intent to preclude the EPA from
requiring compliance with affected states' standards.100 The Court acknowledged that the CWA balanced competing interests, but found the regulations
compatible with that balance.' 0' Therefore, the Court concluded that regulations requiring compliance with downstream states' standards were a
reasonable exercise of EPA discretion. 1°2
In addressing whether the CWA prohibited any additional discharge

into a waterway already in violation of existing water quality standards, the
Court rejected the Tenth Circuit's categorical rule. 03 The Court concluded
that no precedent supported the categorical ban.0 4 In addition the Court
concluded, contrary to the statutory interpretation of the Tenth Circuit, 105
that no provision of the CWA mandates such a ban. °0 Moreover, the Court
noted that a categorical ban would frustrate the intent of the CWA because
it would prohibit construction of new plants with superior technology that
might improve existing conditions. 107
98. Id. at 1057.
99. Id. Arkansas contended that because the legislative history revealed no congressional
statement addressing whether downstream water quality standards should apply, Congress did
not intend to make downstream standards applicable to sources. Petitioner's Brief at 19-20,
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992) (No. 90-1262). In addition Arkansas noted
that Congress had the opportunity to amend the CWA in 1987 to include a veto requirement
when a source would cause a substantial downstream violation, but chose to reject such a
requirement. Id. at 22-23.
100. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1057 (1992).
101. Id.
102. Id. Generally, courts defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute so long as the
interpretation is reasonable. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (holding that court should defer to agency if interpretation
reasonable within meaning of statute).
103. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1057-58. The Tenth Circuit held that the CWA prohibits
any further discharge into an already degraded body of water. See Oklahoma v. E.P.A., 908
F.2d 595, 620 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that CWA prohibits further discharge into already
degraded body of water), rev'd sub nom. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992).
104. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1058. The Court noted that no other federal court had
advanced the Tenth Circuit's theory. Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that no party in the
suit raised the issue during the court proceedings. Id.
105. Id. The Court noted that the only statutory justification the Tenth Circuit invoked
for support was 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h) (1988). Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1058. The Court stated
that section 1342(h) merely authorized the EPA to prohibit a treatment plant from accepting
any further pollutants for treatment until the plant corrects its permit violations, but did not
authorize a complete ban on further discharges into a degraded waterway. Id.
106. Id. The Court noted that the CWA contained provisions which directed compliance
with state water quality standards, but none which mandated a complete ban on discharges
into a waterway not in compliance with the water quality standards. Id. The Court noted that
the CWA instead contained provisions designed to remedy existing water quality violations
and to allocate reduction of discharges between existing sources and new sources. Id.
107. Id. The categorical ban on new discharges concerns the Court because it would
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Finally, the Supreme Court considered whether the EPA decision to
issue the permit was arbitrary and capricious. 08 The Court rejected the
Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the EPA decision was arbitrary and capricious and based on a misinterpretation of Oklahoma's water quality standards. 0 9 The Court stated that lower courts must defer to the EPA if the

EPA acts reasonably," 0 and that in this case, deference was especially
appropriate because water quality standards have a federal character.," The
Court found that the CJO's ruling that only a detectable change in water
quality violates the standards" 2 was reasonable within the meaning of the
CWA."

3

The Court determined that substantial evidence supported the

ALJ's finding of no detectable change, and therefore, the Court concluded
4
that the Tenth Circuit's reversal of the EPA decision was erroneous."

III.

Ti

BALANcE OF POWER FOLLOWING

Arkansas

In Arkansas, the Supreme Court held for the first time that the EPA
may require sources to comply with an affected state's standards."15 The
Court's decision assures downstream states of some affirmative power in
the permit process. Therefore, the Court shifted the balance of power to
equalize the position of downstream states. However, the shift is small. The

Court did not consider Oklahoma's interpretation and application of its
own standards, but rather gave broad deference to the EPA's interpretation

and application of Oklahoma's water quality standards." 6,Arkansas gives
the EPA explicit power to determine whether a discharge will violate a state

prohibit the construction of new plants that would improve existing conditions. Id. Once the
ban is in effect, a new source cannot discharge into the violated waterway. Thus, a newer,
technologically superior plant would not be able to replace an older, more environmentally
destructive plant because the newer plant would add discharge to the already polluted waterway.
A ban would prohibit all new discharges, not merely those that are environmentally unwise.
108. Id. at 1058-61.
109. Id. at 1058-59.
110. Id. at 1060; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (holding that agency interpretation is entitled to judicial deference
because agency has special knowledge and expertise).
111. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1059 (1992). The Court concluded that
state water quality standards have a federal character in the context of interstate water pollution
for two reasons: (1) federal law governs water pollution; and (2) such! a characterization
accords with the CWA purpose of achieving uniform water pollution regulation. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. The Court reasoned that the Chief Judicial Officer's (CJO) interpretation was
sensible in the interstate context because such an interpretation prevented downstream states
from wielding an effective veto over upstream discharges. Id.
114. Id. at 1060.
115. See id. at 1056 (holding that regulations requiring sources to comply with downstream
state's water quality standards were reasonable exercise of EPA statutory discretion).
116. See id. at 1059-60 (holding that Oklahoma's water quality standards had federal
character in interstate context, and that EPA interpretation of the standards was reasonable
and consistent with purposes of CWA).
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standard in future permit conflicts.1 7 With this broad power the EPA may
overrule a state's interpretation of its own standard."'
The Arkansas Court chose not to address whether the CWA requires
source polluters to comply with the water quality standards of an affected
state, reasoning that so long as the regulations were reasonable, a determination of whether they were required was unnecessary." 9 The Court's
refusal to address this question is important for the downstream state
because a statutory mandate provides greater protection than a regulatory
requirement and would place the downstream state on a more equal footing
with the EPA and the source state. 20 Without a statutory mandate, the
downstream state's protection is lessened because the EPA has the ability
to rescind the regulation.
The Court also left unanswered whether the Arkansas balance applies
to state-issued permits. Because Arkansas did not have an approved permit
program, the EPA issued the challenged permit.' 2' Normally, the Supreme
Court defers to a regulatory decision made by an entity with special and
specific expertise."2 When that entity is the EPA, the court has confidence
that the decision is impartial and fair. However, such confidence is lacking
when the entity is a state, because the state is serving its own interests. If
the Supreme Court gives the same deference to a state entity as to the EPA,
the downstream state would be worse off because the source state would
no longer have to convince an impartial entity that the permit it issues is
fair. Therefore, the balance of power would shift in favor of the source
state at the expense of the downstream state. 23
IV.

ANTIDEGRADATION AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

Unlike other federal water quality standards, the CWA does not specifically require an antidegradation provision. Antidegradation is a creature
117. See id. at 1059 (holding that state water quality standards had federal character in
interstate pollution context, and therefore that EPA was entitled to interpret them so long as
its interpretation was reasonable and was consistent with purposes of CWA).
118. See id. (declaring that EPA properly interpreted Oklahoma's water quality standards
even though its interpretation was different from Oklahoma's interpretation).
119. Id. at 1056.
120. See Petitioner's Brief at 29-30, Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992) (No.
90-1262) (arguing that statutory mandate requiring sources to comply with downstream state's
water quality standards would eliminate agency's broad discretion to weigh all factors before
determination).
121. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1055 (1992). The Court appears to affirm
implicitly the EPA regulations permitting an EPA veto of a state permit if such permit does
not comply with any affected state's standards. See id. at 1055-56 (approving same regulatory
language in EPA permit process, thus implicating approval of EPA regulations requiring that
state-issued permits comply with downstream state standards).
122. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (holding that courts should
defer to agency if agency decision rests within area of agency expertise).
123. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (discussing balance of power under
Arkansas). The theoretical scenario changes the balance of power because judicial deference
to the source state would in effect eliminate the veto power of the EPA except in cases of
extreme arbitrariness and capriciousness on the part of the source state.
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solely of EPA regulations.'2 The EPA mandates that each state adopt an

antidegradation regulation that satisfies the minimum requirements specified
in the EPA model.2' However, the EPA issued no guidelines on how to
interpret and apply the model. 126 States have adopted the model without
any explanatory interpretation of their own. 27 The result is uncertainty as
to what the state legislatures intended, and the EPA is free to interpret the
state regulations however it pleases. 128 This lack of boundaries on interpretative scope grants the EPA very broad authority when interstate conflicts
arise.
The EPA model antidegradation standard originated with the 1965
Water Quality Act, the predecessor to the CWA. 129 The Federal Water

Pollution Control Administration issued guidelines for states to follow in
enacting their water quality standards, 30 and these guidelines broadly artic-

ulated an antidegradation policy.' 3 ' Although the guidelines were strict, the
implementation was lax. 32 However, in 1968 the Secretary of the Interior

124. See N. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the
'Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of Clear Air and Clean Water, 62 IowA L. Rv. 643, 674-75
(1977) (discussing legitimacy of antidegradation standard under CWA); Stephen Hull, Note,
Nondeteriorationand the Protection of High Quality Waters Under Federal Water Pollution
Control Law, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 737, 740-45 (same). Various factors legitimize the antidegradation provisions absent statutory authority. First, the EPA had promulgated similar
regulations under the 1965 Act. Hines, supra, at 675. Second, the courts mandated that the
EPA include an antidegradation provision in the CAA. Id.; Hull, supra, at 744-45. Third, the
legislative history of the CWA made considerable reference to an antidegradation policy.
Hines, supra, at 675; Hull, supra, at 743.
For the sake of clarity and consistency, the author will call the EPA antidegradation
provision the EPA model standard, and state antidegradation standards antidegradation regulations.
125. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1991).
126. See Petitioner's Brief at 23, EPA v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992) (No. 901266) (noting lack of national rulemaking or determination on how to interpret and apply
terms of antidegradation standard); Hull, supra note 124, at 748-49 (arguing that antidegradation standards lack detail as to what uses state should protect and what implementation
procedures state should establish to protect those uses).
127. Cf. Petitioner's Brief at 20 n.25, (noting that Oklahoma adopted EPA model standard
with no clear indication of its different interpretation).
128. See United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977) (holding that administrative
agency has considerable authority to interpret vague regulations unless interpretation is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent).
129. See generally Hines, supra note 124 (discussing thoroughly history of antidegradation
under CWA and CAA).
130. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN.,
FOR EsTABLIsmNo WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INTERSTATE WATERS

GUIDELINES

(1966).

131. See id. (articulating officially for first time antidegradation policy). One guideline
stated, "In no case will standards providing for less than existing water quality be acceptable."
Id. at 5. A second guideline required that water quality standards provide for "[t]he maintenance and protection of quality and use or uses of water now of a higher quality or of a
quality suitable for present and potential uses." Id. at 7.
132. See Hines, supra note 124, at 658-59 (discussing effects of stated antidegradation
policy).
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declared that states must adopt regulations conforming to federal antidegradation policy.13 By 1972 all fifty states had adopted an antidegradation
policy statement,
but most states failed to actively implement their policy
34
statements.1
Congress failed to include an antidegradation provision when it enacted
the CWA in 1972.135 However, the EPA determined that an antidegradation
requirement was implicit in the CWA,1 36 and in 1975, promulgated the
current EPA model antidegradation standard that serves as the federal
minimum with which states must comport in developing their own antidegradation regulations.13 7 The model standard cotitains three elements. First,
the state must maintain existing water uses and the level of water quality
necessary to protect those uses. 3 1 Second, the state must maintain existing
water quality when the quality exceeds the fishable-swimmable use designation unless the state determines that lowering of water quality is necessary
for economic or social development. 39 Finally, the model standard requires
that states must maintain and protect the high quality of waters constituting
a national resource. 140 All fifty states have adopted antidegradation regula133. See id. (discussing history of antidegradation policy). Hines comments that the
Secretary's statement firmly established the antidegradation policy as a fully developed concept
within the water pollution laws. Id.
134. See id. at 659-60 (arguing that although all 50 states had adopted antidegradation
standards, standards were largely undeveloped and unenforced by either state or federal
government).
135. See id. at 674 (commenting on omission of antidegradation policy in CWA).
136. See id. at 674-75 (discussing EPA determination that continuation of ixisting water
quality standards implied continued existence of antidegradation policy because policy was
component in earlier water quality standards). The EPA subsequently announced its continued
commitment to the policy, but failed to take further action for over two years. See id. at 675
(discussing history of antidegradation policy).
137. 40 Fed. Reg. 55,340 (1975) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 35.1550(3) (1976)) (current
version at 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1992)).
138. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1) (1992). The regulation provides: "Existing instream water
uses and the level of water quality necessary to protect the existing uses shall be maintained
and protected." Id.
139. Id. § 131.12(a)(2). The regulation provides:
Where the quality of the waters exceed levels necessary to support propagation of
fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in and on the water, that quality shall be
maintained and protected unless the State finds.., that allowing lower water quality
is necessary to accommodate important economic or social development in the area
in which the waters are located. In allowing such degradation or lower water quality,
the State shall assure water quality adequate to protect existing uses fully. Further,
the State shall assure that there shall be achieved the highest statutory and regulatory
requirements for all new and existing point sources and all cost-effective and
reasonable best management practices for nonpoint source control.
Id.
140. Id. § 131.12(a)(3). The regulation provides:
Where high quality waters constitute an outstanding National resource, such as
waters of National and State parks and wildlife refuges and waters of exceptional
recreational or ecological significance, that water quality shall be maintained and
protected.
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tions which at a minimum satisfy the EPA model,' 41 and many of these
regulations are substantially similar to the model EPA standard.14Z
An antidegradation provision appears consistent with congressional intent. 14 Congress enacted the CWA to eliminate water pollution nationally.144
Preventing degradation of high quality waters serves this purpose. Without

a mandatory requirement that high water quality be maintained at its current
level, dischargers would be free to degrade until the water quality significantly deteriorated to a level that violated a specified EPA or state standard.
The result would be increased pollution nationally, contrary to congressional

intent.
A.

45

The EPA Model Antidegradation Standard: Its Shortcomings and
Alternative Approaches
Although the EPA model antidegradation standard plays an important

role in the elimination of water pollution, it has two serious shortcomings.
First, the model standard is vague. 46 It requires that states maintain their
current water quility in their waterways, 147 but fails to articulate a standard
by which to measure maintenance or degradation of quality.

4

Second, the

141. See Gaba, supra note 15, at 1190 n.115 (stating that all states had adopted some
form of antidegradation standard by 1972).
142. See, e.g., Alabama Water Quality Criteria Standards, ALA. ADMN. CODE r. 335-610-.04 (1991), reprinted in [I State Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 701:1002 (1992); Alaska
Water Quality Standards, ALASKA ADMaN. CODE tit. 18, § 70.010(c) (Nov., 1989), reprintedin
[1 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 706:1001 (1990); Arkansas Surface Water Quality
Standards § 3 (1991), reprinted in [I State Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 716:1003 (1992);
Georgia Water Quality Control Regulations, GA. Comn,. R. & REGS. r. 391-3-6-.03(2)(b) (1991),
reprinted in [1 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 751:0503 (1991); Hawaii Water Quality
Standards § 11-54-01.1 (1990), reprinted in [2 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 756:1001
(1990); Idaho Water Quality Standards § 01.2051 (1990), reprinted in [2 State Water Laws]
Env't Rep. (BNA) 761:1004 (1990). The Supreme Court cited the similarity between Oklahoma's
standard and the EPA model as evidence of the reasonableness of the EPA interpretation.
See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1060 (1992) (holding that EPA interpretation
was reasonable because EPA was interpreting its own regulation).
143. See Gaba, supra note 15, at 1191-92 (discussing legality of antidegradation provision
under CWA).
144. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988). The statute provides in relevant part, "The objective of
this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters." Id.
145. Cf. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 256 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that
language similar to CWA in Clean Air Act required antidegradation provision).
146. See WLLiAm N. EsKRm E, JR. & PILIP P. FRicKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC PoLIcY 839 (1988) (arguing that vagueness
is usually intentional and creates variety of possible meanings whereas ambiguity is usually
unintentional and creates "either/or" situation). Because the EPA model has more than two
possible interpretations, the author considers it vague rather than ambiguous.
147. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a) (1991).
148. See Gaba, supra note 15, at 1192-94 (arguing that EPA antidegradation policy lacks
focus and therefore fails to identify what policy is actually protecting); supra notes 138-40
and accompanying text (discussing EPA antidegradation model's requirements for maintaining
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model standard includes an exception 'capable of swallowing the rule. 49 The
model standard permits a state to degrade water quality if the state determines that the degrading discharges are necessary to further important

economic or social development. 50 However, the standard fails to specify
what specifically constitutes important economic and social development,,"
and thus, virtually all source polluters could defend such a claim. Because
Arkansas granted the EPA broad power to interpret state water quality

regulations over state objections,112 this vague model standard with its broad
provides very limited protection to waters of existing high qualexception
ity. 53
However, states are not helpless. A state can assert its own interpretation
by rewriting its antidegradation regulations so the regulation is clear, precise,

and objective.5 4 In so doing, the downstream state narrows the range of
permissible interpretations available to the EPA. Two states have added
clarity, precision, and objectivity: Colorado 55 and Wisconsin. 5 6 In addition,
the EPA has itself adopted a clear157and objective antidegradation standard
for a different resource-clean air.

high water quality). Gaba notes that the EPA has combined a protection of existing use
concept with a protection of existing water quality. See Gaba, supra note 15, at 1192-94
(discussing differing concepts included within antidegradation policy). Gaba argues that these
opposing concepts of deterioration result in a vague policy with little focus. See id. (arguing
that combination of use-oriented policy and water quality policy contributed significantly to
vagueness in standard).
149. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing EPA model's economic and
social development exception to antidegradation policy). Gaba suggests that the failure to
specify exactly what constitutes justifiable reasons could leave the policy with few existing
degradation limitations. See Gaba, supra note 15, at 1193 (discussing potential problems with
economic and social development exception to antidegradation policy).
150. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) (1992).
151. See id. § 131.12(a)(2) (allowing degradation if such degradation is necessary to
accommodate important economic or social development, but issuing no guidance as to what
constitutes important development); Hull, supra note 124, at 749-50 (discussing EPA failure
to include standards for determining what is necessary to accommodate economic or social
development).
152. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1059-60 (1992) (holding that EPA had
authority to reasonably interpret state water quality standards).
153. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.
65, 73 (1983) (arguing that vague standard invites misinterpretation because it may be underinclusive and overinclusive); Gaba, supra note 15, at 1192-93 (noting water quality protection
limitations of EPA antidegradation policy).
154. See United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977) (holding that administrative
agency has considerable authority to interpret vague regulations unless interpretation is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent). Conversely, it follows that an agency has less authority and discretion
to interpret when the regulations are detailed, clear, and unambiguous.
155. See infra notes 160-73 and accompanying text (discussing clarity, precision, and
objectivity of Colorado's water quality regulations).
156. See infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text (discussing clarity, precision, and
objectivity of Wisconsin's water quality regulations).
157. See infra notes 208-28 and accompanying text (discussing clarity, precision, and
objectivity of Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) provision of CAA).
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Colorado's antidegradation enforcement rests with the state Water Quality Division and the Water Quality Control Commission.'" The Colorado
antidegradation regulations include a general rule similar to the EPA model
standard, 159 but also include specific evaluation criteria and review procedures that add clarity, precision, and objectivity.
Colorado expands the EPA model standard with an explicit review
procedure for new or additional discharges that may degrade the water
quality. 160 First, the procedure requires the Water Quality Division to make
a degradation determinationl6' based on an exact, numeric formula. 62 The
Water Quality Division applies the formula to the permit application and
compares the results to specific values for degradation listed in the regulations. 6 Based upon this precise calculation and comparison, the Water

158. Colorado Water Quality Standards § 3.1.8(3)(b) (1991), reprinted in [1 State Water
Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 726:1007 (1992).
159. Compare id. § 3.1.8(1)(a), reprinted in [1 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 726:1006
with EPA antidegradation policy, supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text (containing similar
language in both standards). The Colorado regulations provide in relevant part:
(i) The highest level of water quality protection applies to certain waters that
constitute an outstanding state or national resource. These waters, which are those
designated high quality I ... shall be maintained and protected at their existing
quality.
(ii) An intermediate level of water quality protection applies to certain other high
quality waters. These waters shall be maintained and protected at their existing
quality unless it is determined that allowing lower water quality ,is necessary to
accommodate important economic or social development in the area in which the
waters are located ....

For these waters, no degradation is allowed unless deemed

appropriate following an antidegradation review.... Further, all applicable statutory
and regulatory requirements for point sources and, if applicable control regulations
have been adopted, all cost-effective and reasonable best management practices for
nonpoint sources shall be met.
(iii) At a minimum, for all State surface waters existing classified uses and the
level of water quality necessary to protect such uses shall be maintained and protected.
No further water quality degradation is allowable which would interfere with or
become injurious to these uses. The classified uses shall be deemed protected if the
narrative and numerical standards are not exceeded.
Colorado Water Quality Standards § 3.1.8(l)(a).
160. Colorado Water Quality Standards § 3.1.8(3), reprinted in [1 State Water Laws]
Env't Rep. at 726:1007-08.
161. Id. § 3.1.8(3)(c), reprintedin [1 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 726:1007-08.
162. Id. The regulation provides:
The initial step in an antidegradation review shall be a determination whether the
activity in question is likely to result in significant degradation of reviewable waters,
with respect to adopted narrative or numeric standards. This significance determination shall be made with respect to the net effect of the new or increased water
quality impacts of the proposed activity, taking into account any, environmental
benefits resulting from the activity and any water quality-enhancing mitigation
measures impacting the segment or segments under review, if such measures are
incorporated with the proposed activity.
Id.
163. Id. The regulation provides:
The activity shall be considered not to result in significant degradation, as measured
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Quality Division determines whether the new discharge significantly degrades
the water quality. 164
If the degradation determination shows that the proposed activity is
likely to result in a significant degradation of water quality, the Water
Quality Division must determine whether the degradation is necessary to
accommodate important economic or social development. 65 In order for
the permit applicant to meet this requirement, the Water Quality Division
must determine that the proposed activity is important for development.166
The applicant must submit supporting evidence, 67 and the public may submit
contrary evidence during a public review process1l s The Water Quality
Division decides whether the proposed activity is important based upon the
evidence, giving substantial weight to relevant determinations by local governments and land use planning authorities. 169
If the Water Quality Division determines that the proposed activity is
important to development, it then must determine whether appropriate
alternatives are available. 70 Appropriate alternatives include measures that

Id.

in the reviewable waters segment, if;
(i) The value of a new or increased discharge under review is small enough that
it will be diluted by 100 to 1 or more at low flow, as defined in section 3.1.9, by
water in the stream; or
(ii) The new or increased loading from the source under review is less than 10
percent of the existing total load to that segment for critical constituents ... ;
provided, that the cumulative impact of increased loadings from all sources shall
not exceed 10 percent of the baseline total load established for the segment ... ; or
(iii) The new or increased loading from the source under review will consume,
after mixing, less than 15 percent of the available increment between low flow
pollutant concentrations and the relevant standards for critical constituents; or
(iv) The activity will result in only temporary or short term changes in water
quality.

164. Id.
165. Id. § 3.1.8(3)(d), reprinted in [I State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 726:1008.
166. Id. § 3.1.8(3)(d)(ii), reprinted in [1 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 726:1008.
167. Id. If the permit applicant submits evidence, the Water Quality Division presumes
that the proposed activity is important development unless another party submits evidence to
the contrary. Id.
168. Id. The public may submit evidence contrary to the applicant's evidence during the
public review process. Id. The regulations require that the Water Quality Division consider all
information received when it makes its determination as to the economic and social importance
of the proposed activity. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. § 3.1.8(3)(d)(iii), reprinted in [I State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 726:1008. The
regulation provides:
This determination shall be based on an assessment of whether such alternatives
are available, based upon a reasonable level of analysis by the project proponent,
consistent with accepted engineering practice, and any information submitted by the
public or which is otherwise available. The assessment shall address practical water
quality control technologies, the feasibility and availability of which has been
demonstrated under field conditions similar to those of the activity under review.
The scope of alternatives considered shall be limited to those that would accomplish
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would result in no degradation or less degradation than the proposed activity
and are economically, environmentally, and technologically feasible.17 ' The
regulations list specific analytic techniques for the evaluation of alternatives,' 72 including accepted engineering practices and cost-benefit analyses. 73
The Colorado antidegradation regulation eliminates much of the EPA
model standard's vagueness. The regulation explicitly and precisely states
what constitutes the prohibited level of degradation. 74 In contrast, the EPA
model merely states that water quality "shall be maintained and protected.' 75 Nothing in the model indicates what degradation, if any, would
constitute a violation. 76 In grappling with the EPA model, the ALJ in
Arkansas found prohibited degradation when the discharge caused an undue
impact on the water quality; 7 7 the CJO found prohibited degradation when
the discharge caused a detectable violation of water quality. 17 The EPA
model is vague enough to encompass "undue impact," "detectable violation," and many other interpretations. The Colorado regulation, on the
other hand, specifies in exact detail what constitutes prohibited degradation. 7 9 Colorado applies a formula to determine the level of degradation
produced by the activity. 80 The Water Quality Division compares the
verifiable results to a set of numeric values included within the regulation
to determine whether the regulation prohibits the amount of degradation
produced.' 8 ' Such detail makes the regulation clear, precise, and objective,
thus narrowing the range of permissible interpretations.
Although Colorado significantly improves upon the EPA model regarding the degradation determination, it remains vague regarding the economic
and social development exception. Colorado leaves considerable discretion
with the Water Quality Division to determine whether the proposed activity

the proposed activity's purpose. Any alternatives that would be inconsistent with
section 25-8-104 of the Water Quality Control Act shall not be considered available
alternatives.
Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado's procedure for
determining whether permit applicant would degrade high water quality significantly).
175. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (discussing EPA model antidegradation
standard).
176. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (discussing EPA model antidegradation
standard).
177. Petitioner's Brief Appendix F at 105a, Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992)
(No. 90-1262).
178. Id. at Appendix G, 117a.
179. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text (discussing clarity of Colorado's
degradation determination).
180. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado's degradation
determination formula).
181. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado's procedure for
determining whether applicant would significantly degrade water quality).
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is important development.1 2 However, Colorado limits this discretion somewhat by requiring the Water Quality Division to engage in a standardized
method of alternative analysis using accepted engineering practices and costbenefit analyses.' 83 Although Colorado's economic and social development
exception allows some interpretive discretion, on the whole its antidegradation regulation greatly narrows the broad range of interpretations permissible under the EPA model.114
Wisconsin also departed from the EPA model by adding detail to its
water antidegradation policy. However, unlike Colorado,' 85 Wisconsin separated its antidegradation regulation and its implementation procedure into
two distinct regulations: the Wisconsin Water Quality Standards" 6 and the
Wisconsin Water Pollution Rules.'1 The antidegradation provision within
the Water Quality Standards is similar to the EPA model.'88 Wisconsin adds
clarity by means of its procedural implementing rules, which apply to all
proposed new or increased discharges into the surface waters of the state. 8 9
The Wisconsin implementing rules add clarity by defining key terms' 9°
such as "assimilative capacity,"' 9' "increased discharge," 92 and "significant

182. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado's economic and
social development exception).
183. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado's economic and
social development exception).
184. Compare supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing EPA model's social and
economic development exception) with supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text (discussing
Colorado's social and economic development exception).
185. See supra notes 158-73 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado's antidegradation
policy and procedure).
186. Wisconsin Water Standards, Wis. ADMN. CODE § NR 102.05(1)(a) (Aug. 1989),
reprinted in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 951:1003 (1989). The regulation provides:
No waters of the state shall be lowered in quality unless it has been affirmatively
demonstrated to the department that such a change is justified as a result of necessary
economic and social development, provided that no new or increased effluent
interferes with or becomes injurious to any assigned uses made of or presently
possible in such waters.
Id.
187. Wisconsin Water Pollution Rules, Wis. ADmu. CODE § NR 207 (Mar. 1989), reprinted
in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 951:0511 (1989).
188. Compare supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (discussing EPA model antidegradation standard) with supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin's
antidegradation standard).
189. Wisconsin Water Pollution Rules § NR 207.01(1), reprintedin [6 State Water Laws]
Env't Rep. at 951.0511.
190. Id. § NR 207.02, reprinted in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 951:0511.
191. Id. § NR 207.02(1), reprinted in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 951:0511. The
regulations provide, "'Assimilative capacity' means the difference between the water quality
criterion for a substance.. .and the existing level of the substance in a surface water." Id. A
precise definition of assimilative capacity is important because Wisconsin uses this term in the
determination of significant degradation. Id. § NR 207.05, reprinted in [6 State Water Laws]
Env't Rep. at 951:0512.2-12.3.
192. Id. § NR 207.02(6)(a), reprinted in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 951.0511.
The regulations provide, "'Increased discharge' means any change in concentration, level or
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lowering of water quality."' 93 In addition, the rules prescribe a specific
procedure for antidegradation determinations.'9 First, the Department of
Natural Resources must determine whether the proposed discharge will cause
a significant lowering of water quality,' 95 using a precise numeric formula
contained within the regulations. ,96 If the results of this calculation compare
unfavorably with specific values listed in the regulation, the determination
is that the discharge will cause a significant lowering of water quality. 97

loading of a substance which would exceed an effluent limitation specified in a current WPDES
permit." Id.
193. Id. § NR 207.02(11), reprinted in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 951:0511. The
regulations provide, "'Significant lowering of water quality' means a lowering of water quality
determined to be significant under s. NR 207.05." Id.
194. Id. § NR 207.03-.05, reprinted in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 951:0511-12.3.
195. Id. § NR 207.05, reprinted in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 951:0512.2-12.3.
196. Id. § NR 207.05(2), reprinted in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 951:0512.2.
The regulations provide:
(a) Determine the expected levels of the indicator parameters in the discharge.
(b) Determine existing levels of the indicator parameters upstream of, or adjacent
to, the discharge site using applicable procedures in chs. NR 102 and 106 or specified
by the department if none of those procedures apply....
(c) Calculate expected levels in the receiving water of the indicator parameters as
a result of the proposed new or increased discharge. In calculating expected levels
in the receiving water, the following shall be used:
1. Applicable design low flow rates or dilution ratios for the receiving water in
ch. NR 102 or 106 or specified by the department if none of those rates or ratios
apply.
2. The daily average discharge loading rates for the new or increased portion of
a municipal discharge or the yearly average discharge loading rates for the new or
increased portion of an industrial discharge.
(d) Compare the expected levels in the receiving water of each indicator parameter
as calculated in par. (c) to:
1. The assimilative capacity multiplied by one-third for all indicator parameters
except dissolved oxygen; or
2. The sum of the existing level multiplied by two-thirds and the water quality
criterion multiplied by one-third for dissolved oxygen.
Id.
197. Id. § NR 207.05(4), reprinted in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 951:0512.3.
The regulations provide:
The department shall determine that a proposed new or increased discharge will
result in a significant lowering of water quality if either:
(a) The proposed new or increased discharge, along with all other new or increased
discharges after March 1, 1989, taking into account any changes in assimilative
capacity over time that have been demonstrated .

. .,

results in an expected level of

an indicator parameter in the receiving water of either of the following:
1. Greater than one-third multiplied by the assimilative capacity for any indicator
parameter other than dissolved oxygen; or
2. Greater than the sum of the existing level multiplied by two-thirds and the
water quality criterion multiplied by one-third for dissolved oxygen.
(b) For a discharge to Great Lakes waters or their tributaries, the mass loading
to the receiving water of any substance in the proposed new or increased discharge
having a bioaccumulation factor greater than 250 would be increased.
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Following such a determination, the permit applicant must show that
the proposed activity will accommodate important economic or social development. 9s The Wisconsin rules specifically list several items that constitute important economic or social development. 199 For example, the list
includes an increase in employment; an increase in production; an avoidance
of a reduction in employment; an increase in efficiency; and an increase in
industrial, commercial, or residential growth in the community. 20° Finally,
the permit applicant
must show that no cost-effective way exists to prevent
20 1
the degradation.
Wisconsin adds clarity, precision, and objectivity to its regulation by
giving clear, exact definitions of terms used without definition in the EPA
model. 202 Furthermore, the Wisconsin regulation relies heavily upon exact,
numerical criteria for the determination of impact on water quality, rendering the determination objective and verifiable. 203 Finally, unlike Colorado, 204 Wisconsin adds considerable clarity to its economic and social
development exception. 205 The regulation lists exactly what constitutes an
important economic or social development. 206 The Wisconsin regulation not
only reduces the range of permissible interpretations under the EPA model,
but also improves on the Colorado regulation. 2° Wisconsin's regulation is
clear, precise, and objective and permits only a narrow range of interpretations.
198. Id. § NR 207.04(1)(c), reprinted in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 951:0512.1.
199. Id. § NR 207.04(1)(c)1, reprinted in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 951:0512.1.
200. Id.
201. Id. § NR 207.04(1)(d), reprinted in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. at 951:0512.1.
The regulations provide in relevant part:
If the new or increased discharge is found to result in a significant lowering of
water quality or if the person proposing the new or increased discharge has waived
the procedure ..

.,

the permit applicant shall demonstrate the following:

1. The proposed significant lowering of water quality cannot be prevented in a
cost effective manner by the following types of pollution control alternatives;
a. Use of conservation measures.
b. Use of recycling measures.
c. Use of other applicable wastewater treatment process or operational changes.
d. Use of source reduction measures.
Id.
202. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin's use of definitions in antidegradation standard).
203. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin's use of specific
numeric criteria).
204. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado's vagueness in
its important social and economic development exception).
205. Compare supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado's economic
and social development exception) with supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (discussing
Wisconsin's economic and social development exception).
206. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin's list of important
social and economic activities).
207., Compare supra text accompanying notes 165-73 (discussing economic and social
development exception of Colorado standard and its weaknesses) with supra notes 198-201 and
accompanying text (discussing economic and social development exception of Wisconsin standard).
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Finally, the EPA formulated a clear set of antidegradation standards
over ten years ago for another resource-clean air. 28 The Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA)
requires that each state's clean air plan contain a provision to prevent
significant deterioration of air quality in areas that have attained a level of
high quality.2 9 The CAA adds precision through the use of defined maximum allowable increases for discharge pollutants. 210 The CAA lists in
numeric detail the prohibited level of deterioration for a new or additional
discharge of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter2" and requires that the
EPA adopt similar regulations for other air pollutants.2 1 2 In addition, the

208. 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (1988); Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, 40
C.F.R. §§ 51.166, 52.21 (1992). Clean air antidegradation originated in 1969 and was modeled
after the antidegradation policy in the 1966 Water Guidelines. See Hines, supra note 124, at
660 (discussing history of antidegradation under CWA and CAA). However, soon after
publication of the 1969 Air Guidelines, Congress completely revised the current air laws with
its enactment of the CAA in 1970. Id. Because the CAA did not contain an antidegradation
provision, questions arose over the authority of the EPA to require such a provision. Id. at
661. The EPA originally continued the antidegradation policy; however, within a few months,
the EPA reversed its position and no longer required such a policy. Id. 'at 663. However, in
1972 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit issued an injunction
against EPA approval of state implementation plans allowing significant deterioration of air
quality, and ordered the EPA to promulgate corrective regulations. See Sierra Club v.
Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 256-57 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that EPA failure to include
antidegradation standard was contrary to legislative policy of CAA). As a result, the EPA
developed regulations to prevent significant deterioration of air quality. See Hines, supra note
124, at 668-73 (discussing development of prevention of significant deterioration regulations).
In 1977 Congress amended the CAA to include provisions for the prevention of significant
deterioration of air quality. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (1988). Thus, the EPA has treated
antidegradation under the CAA less consistently than under the CWA; yet currently, the
prevention of significant deterioration of air quality is statutorily authorized whereas the
antidegradation provisions of the EPA lack such authorization. See Hines, supra note 124, at
673-74.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 7471 (1988). The geographic scope of this section has been considered
quite broad. See David P. Currie, Nondegradation and Visibility Under the Clean Air Act, 68
CAL. L. Ray. 48, 51-54 (1980) (discussing potentially broad scope of PSD provisions). Currie
does note that the courts have tried to limit the scope of the provisions. Id.; see Alabama
Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that PSD provisions do
not apply to sources in nonattainment areas merely because source has adverse impact on
clean air area within same state). However, Currie suggests that these attempts to limit the
broad scope have little practical significance because the EPA has determined that almost
every area in the country shows attainment for at least one pollutant. Currie, supra, at 54.
Therefore, the CAA will require PSD review for almost every permit applicant. Id.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (1988).
211. Id.
212. Id. § 7476. Section 7476 governs such pollutants as hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide,
petrochemical oxidants, and nitrogen oxides. Id. The statute further provides:
(c) Such regulations shall provide specific numerical measures against which
permit applicants may be evaluated, a framework for stimulating improved control
technology, protection of air quality values, and fulfill the goals and purposes set
forth in section 7401 and section 7470 of this title.
(d) The regulations of the Administrator under subsection (a) of this section shall

1993]

INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION

1367

CAA adds clarity by defining key terms. 213 These definitions specify which
sources are subject to the PSD provisions 214 and what point
in time estabconcentration. 215

lishes the benchmark level of air quality
The CAA regulations add further detail to the PSD provisions. 2 6 The
regulations expand upon the CAA list of definitions by adding approximately
twenty-five key terms, 2 7 such as "net emissions increase ' 218 and "significant. '219 The definitions include numeric factors and guidelines that inform
states and permit applicants whether the PSD provisions apply to a proposed

activity.
The regulations also include a detailed permit procedure within the PSD
provisions. 22' The regulations list the qualifications that make the PSD
provisions applicable to the permit applicant and list exemptions that allow

the source to avoid the permitting process. 2m If the provision applies to the
permit applicant, the applicant must undergo a series of reviews, 2 3 including
a review of the proposed technology, 24 a review of the potential impact of
the polluting source on air quality, 225 a review of the current air quality, 226
and a review of the potential impact of the source on other resources. 227 A
provide specific measures at least as effective as the increments established in section
7473 of this title to fulfill such goals and purposes, and may contain air quality
increments, emission density requirements, or other measures.
Id.
213. Id.§ 7479.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166 (1992) (discussing state implementation plan for prevention of
significant deterioration of air quality); id. § 52.21 (discussing federal implementation plan for
prevention of significant deterioration of air quality). These two sections are largely the same
in terms of basic degradation requirements. Compare id. § 51.166 with id. § 52.21 (including
similar provisions regarding basic degradation requirements).
217. Id. §§ 51.166(b), 52.21(b).
218. Id. §§ 51.166(b)(3), 52.21(b)(3). The regulations provide:
(i) Net emissions increase means the amount by which the sum of the following
exceeds zero:
(a) Any increase in actual emissions from a particular physical change or change
in method of operation at a stationary source; and
(b) Any other increases and decreases in actual emissions at the source that are
contemporaneous with the particular change and are otherwise creditable.
Id.
The regulations continue to describe what increases and decreases are creditable for the
net emission increase determination. Id.
219. Id. §§ 51.166(b)(23), 52.21(b)(23). The regulations list a schedule of rates for various
pollutants. Id. The regulations state that if the net emissions increase or the potential of a
source to emit exceeds these set rates, the deterioration is significant. Id.
220. Id. §§ 51.166(b), 52.21(b).
221. Id. §§ 51.166, 52.21.
222. Id. §§ 51.166(i), 52.21(i).
223. Id. §§ 51.166(j)-(r), 52.21(j)-(r).
224. Id. §§ 51.166(j), 52.210).
225. Id. §§ 51.166(k), 52.21(k).,
226. Id. §§ 51.166(m), 52.21(m).
227. Id. §§ 51.166(o), 52.21(o).
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standardized air quality model serves as the basis of the review process.22
As a result, the procedure has considerable specificity and is subject to
verifiable standards.
The CAA-PSD provisions demonstrate that an EPA antidegradation
standard can be clear, precise, and objective. The PSD provision defines in

specific detail terms used throughout,2 9 so the meaning of the provision's

language is clear. The PSD provision also expresses in exact numeric terms

the prohibited level of air quality deterioration 210 and establishes a specific,
detailed procedure based on a standardized model' 31 The result is an
antidegradation standard that is clear, precise, and objective with a narrow
range of permissible interpretations.
A specific and precise standard is advantageous for an affected state

because it narrows the range of permissible interpretations by outside
sources.? 2 However, increased specificity offers one disadvantage: it reduces
an affected state's own discretion and internal flexibility to handle unforeseen hazards.2 3 For example, a state may consider one pollutant safe based
on current knowledge, and thus not include it within its own specific
antidegradation regulation. Ten years later, new scientific data may show
that the pollutant constitutes a health hazard. If the state's regulation is so
precise as to be inflexible, the state will not be able to regulate that pollutant

without rewriting its standard?.34 Therefore, although the state's antidegradation standard needs more specificity, the affected state should save some
limited vagueness to maintain flexibility for future unforeseen hazards2 3

228. Id. §§ 51.166(1), 52.21(1).
229. See supra notes 213-20 and accompanying text (discussing PSD provisions' definitions
of key terms).
230. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing CAA determination of significant deterioration).
231. See supra notes 221-28 and accompanying text (discussing CAA PSD permit procedure).
232. See infra text accompanying notes 237-48 (discussing benefits of specific and detailed
antidegradation standards to affected state).
233. See Diver, supra note 153, at 73 (arguing that rulemaker may be unable to predict
every future consequence of clearly stated rule, and thus, actual outcome may differ from
what was originally intended); Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HAtv. L. Rav. 361, 372
(1985) (arguing that vagueness in rules provides flexibility that enables accommodation of
unexpected and unforeseen events).
234. See Diver, supra note 153, at 73 (arguing that rulemaker can change clearly stated
rule after learning of its failure to include unforeseeable events; however, process of amendment
is costly and gives rise to social losses in interim).
235. See Colorado Water Quality Standards § 3.1.8(3)(d) (1991), reprinted in [U State
Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 726:1008 (1992) (granting Water Quality Division some
discretion for determining whether proposed activity is important for social or economic
development); Wisconsin Water Pollution Rules, Wis. ArDlr. CODE § NR 207.04(c) (Mar.
1989), reprinted in [6 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 951:0512.1 (1989) (retaining
decisionmaker discretion in social or economic development exception by including broad
concepts of development in list); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(g) (1992) (retaining decisionmaker discretion
in redesignation of air quality classifications so that areas may be subject to stricter or more
lenient standards as conditions change over time).
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The affected state should narrow, but not eliminate, the range of permissible
interpretations.
B. A Better Antidegradation Standard
A state can assert its own interpretation of its antidegradation regulation

by rewriting the regulation to add clarity and precision. The rewritten
regulation should include detail, measurable and objective criteria, and a

standardized procedure.236 Such a regulation will protect a state's autonomy

because it will limit the range of permissible interpretations available to the

EPA and to other states in determining whether a discharge will be a
violation.
A detailed antidegradation standard provides a basis for appeal if an
EPA decisionmaker interprets the standard differently than the state. Or-

dinarily, courts defer to an agency interpretation unless it is arbitrary and
capricious.-- In Arkansas, the Supreme Court deferred to the EPA interpretation because the interpretation was reasonable in light of CWA principles and purposes. 38 However, a more detailed standard with specific
guidelines offers less interpretive discretion than does a vague standard.3 9
Therefore, an interpretation that strays far from the clear meaning of a
precise standard is more likely to be arbitrary and capricious. A state that
writes a clear and precise standard limits EPA power to undermine state
intent through interpretation.
In addition, a detailed antidegradation regulation should entitle the state
to EPA deference. The EPA must approve each state's water quality

standards, including any detailed procedure contained within the antidegradation provision. Therefore, because the EPA reviewed and approved the
detailed procedure, it should defer to the state's consistent application of
the rule. Otherwise, the EPA frustrates the CWA's carefully constructed
balance of power allowing states the opportunity to alter the EPA model

standard provided that such alteration meets the federal minimums. 24'
236. See supra notes 158-73 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado's detailed antidegradation standard); supra notes 185-201 and accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin's
detailed antidegradation standard); supra notes 208-28 and accompanying text (discussing CAA
antidegradation standard).
237. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984) (holding that court should defer to agency if agency interpretation is reasonable
within meaning of statute).
238. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1059 (1992) (holding that EPA
interpretation was reasonable and consistent with purposes and principles of CWA).
239. See United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977) (holding that administrative
agency has considerable authority to interpret vague regulations unless interpretation is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent).
240. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1988). The statute requires that whenever a state revises or
adopts a new standard, the state shall submit the standard to the EPA for review. Id. §
1313(c)(2). Upon EPA determination that the new standard meets the requirements of the
CWA, the EPA shall approve the standard, and the standard becomes effective within the
state. Id. § 1313(c)(3).
241. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text (discussing CWA balance of power
within NPDES permit scheme).
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A detailed standard also protects a downstream state when the decisionmaker is a source state. Because most states have federally approved
NPDES programs, 24 2 they may issue permits with little EPA involvement. 243
Source states have little incentive to sympathize with the concerns of a
downstream neighbor, especially when the affected neighbor's water quality
standards are stricter than their own. The affected state has the opportunity
for comment,2" but the source state is free to determine whether the
discharge will violate the water quality of the affected state. 24 The affected
state's only recourse is to appeal to the EPA. 2m However, the EPA will
likely defer to the source state's determination unless the affected state
offers evidence that the source state violated the NPDES requirements. 47
A vague standard will not provide sufficient evidence because the source
state can interpret the standard to defend its position. The source state will
have a more difficult time defending its interpretation when the permit
violates a clear, precise, and objective regulation, and the EPA will be more
likely to review the source state's decision and veto apparent violations.
Furthermore, in the event that the EPA fails to give relief to the affected
state, the affected state may appeal to the courts. Armed with a clear and
detailed antidegradation regulation, the affected state can challenge as
arbitrary and capricious a lax interpretation by the EPA and the source
state. 248
V.

CONCLUSION

After Arkansas, the interstate water pollution's tangle of competing and
conflicting interests seemed to provide affected states with little power to
protect their waters. However, a closer examination reveals that the affected
state is not powerless. If the affected state departs from the vague EPA
model standard and adopts a clear, precise, and objective antidegradation
regulation, the affected state narrows the range of permissible interpretations. Therefore, the affected state removes much of the broad EPA
discretion to interpret the state's regulation in a way that allows other states
to pollute its waters. This result is in keeping with the purpose of the CWA
1

242. See Cherney & Wardinski, supra note 22, at 234 (stating that EPA has approved 39
jurisdictions to administer own NPDES programs).
243. See id. (commenting that when EPA transfers administration of NPDES program to
state governments, it relinquishes its control over day-to-day operations so long as federal
requirements are met).
244. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5) (1988).
245. Id.
246. Id. § 1342(d)(2).
247. Cf. id. § 1342 (structuring EPA role as mainly oversight role in NPDES program).
For the program to work as designed, the states shall make the determinations, and the EPA
shall only object and veto a state determination if there is clear evidence of a program violation.
Id.
248. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text (discussing how detailed and precise
antidegradation standards provide opportunity for appeal on grounds of arbitrariness and
capriciousness).
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to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters." 249
MARY A. STILTS

249. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).

